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Abstract: Theists claim that God can make a causal difference in the world. That is, theists believe 
that God is causally efficacious, has power. Discussion of divine power has centered on 
understanding better the metaphysics of creation and sustenance, special intervention, governance, 
and providing an account of omnipotence consistent with other divine attributes, such as 
omnibenevolence. But little discussion has centered on what, deep down ontologically, God’s power 
is. I show that a number of prominent accounts of power fail to model what a classical God’s power 
could be, and then develop an account based on teleological and primitivist accounts of power.     
[F]or if it does not act, there will be no movement. 
Aristotle (Meta., XII.6 1071b 17-18) 
Whence it most fittingly belongs to Him to be an active principle… 
St. Thomas Aquinas (ST, I, q25. a1. co.) 
1. Introduction 
Whether God is understood fundamentally as the ultimate ontological ground of reality, the greatest 
possible or maximal being, or that being most worthy of worship, theists believe that God is 
metaphysically responsible for reality, somehow. Many believe that responsibility is to be cashed out in 
terms of God’s creating and sustaining reality. This means that theists believe God is among that 
class of beings that can make a difference in the world, that God has causal power.1  
 Metaphysicians generally understand a power (or disposition) to be an intrinsic capacity of 
an object to bring about some type of manifestation, given the right conditions or if mingled with 
 
1 I should note that assuming some x has a power from the fact that x is causally relevant is controversial. Some think 
the shape of an object is causally relevant but not itself a power. I deny this, but will not defend my position here. For 
further discussion, see Bird (2007: 154-160) and Heil (2012: 59-62).  
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the right manifestation partners.2 For instance, sugar has the power to dissolve should it be mixed 
with some hot coffee, and we have the power to cognize entities beyond us, even ones that don’t 
exist. But it is controversial how to spell out best exactly what a power amounts to ontologically. 
Powers seem to be ‘directed at’ or ‘causally ready for’ their manifestations, but what does this mean? 
How are we to understand, metaphysically, something being directed towards a manifestation, 
whether or not that manifestation exists? Is a power a higher-order relation between first-order 
properties, whether instantiated or not? Or perhaps is it a quasi-intentional or teleological feature of 
objects? Taking the directionality of powers as my focus, the question I pursue here is: what does an 
adequate ontological account of God’s power look like?3 
While philosophers and theologians have written extensively on God’s power, few have tried 
to explicate an ontological account of divine power. The question I pursue is distinct from questions 
discussed in the divine action literature, where what is in question is whether God creates all of 
reality directly or through mediating causes. It is distinct from questions about how God governs the 
world, whether through realistically construed laws of nature or dispositional essences. It is distinct 
from discussion in the special intervention literature, where what is in question is how to model best 
God’s intervention in the created realm.4 And it is distinct from questions in the omnipotence 
literature, where what is in question is what being all-powerful amounts to, and whether being all-
powerful is consistent with other attributes, like being all-good, that God is traditionally thought to 
have. While the account given here may very well have implications for these other debates, it 
attempts an answer to a question so far given little attention.  
 
2 Most believe powers are individuated by the type of manifestation they are for and their stimulus conditions. For 
instance, solubility is the power to dissolve (type) when placed in a solvent (stimulus condition). But some, e.g. Heil 
(2003: 83-84, 2012: 72-75), Martin (2008: ch. 1, 48-51), and Williams (2019: ch. 3), discard talk of stimulus conditions 
and prefer talk of mutual manifestation partners: other dispositions properly mingled with the disposition of interest. So, 
for example, the disposition to dissolve possessed of some sugar mutually manifests with the disposition to dissolve 
solutes possessed of some hot coffee, resulting in a dissolving. Others still, e.g. Vetter (2015: ch. 3), do without stimulus 
conditions altogether. Some also believe that there could be extrinsic powers, that perfect duplicates could somehow have 
different dispositional profiles (McKitrick 2003). For now, we needn’t worry about these subtleties, but I mention both 
stimulus conditions and mutual manifestation partners throughout for completeness.     
3 Although ‘power’ has been and by some contemporary metaphysicians is considered to be synonymous with 
‘potentiality,’ I do not think ascribing power to God means we ascribe potentiality to God. Following Aquinas and many 
others, I reject the view that God has passive powers, or may be acted on, but I believe God has active powers inasmuch as 
God can act on others. In fact, at least in the case of creatures, I am suspicious of the distinction between active and 
passive powers itself; see Heil (2012: ch. 6) and Wahlberg (2019) for further discussion. 
4 For discussion of these questions from a dispositionalist perspective, see Adams (2018), Gasser and Quitterer (2015), 
Göcke (2015), Page (2015), and Schultz and D’Andrea-Winslow (2017).  
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After a few preliminary remarks and clarifications, I present on-hand accounts of powers 
and show they fail to model divine power. Then I provide what I take to be a promising and 
informative account of divine power, based in part on teleological and primitivist accounts of power. 
In brief, I suggest that divine power is understood best as a primitively (self-)directed, irreducible 
feature or aspect of the divine essence that lacks stimulus conditions or manifestation partners. One 
upshot of the proposal is that, should some theists be humeans about the creaturely realm, they 
must accept irreducible power in at least one instance.    
1. Some Preliminaries 
Before starting in earnest, allow me some preliminaries and to head-off some initial objections. First, 
the God I have in mind is the God Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas, the God of classical theism. I 
take God to be simple, atemporally eternal, immutable, impassible, infinite, to exist a se, et cetera. I 
mention this for clarity and completeness, but should note that a neo-classical conception of God 
countenancing only some of these attributes is sufficient for my arguments to go through.5 Second, I 
understand a power or disposition to be a capacity or ability, not a mere tendency or liability. 
Another way of putting this is that I believe powers necessitate their manifestations; it is physically 
(and metaphysically) impossible for a lump of sugar to fail to dissolve in a cup of hot coffee—
solubility doesn’t just increase the probability that a lump of sugar will dissolve.6      
(i) But given a classical conception of God, you might wonder whether it is worthwhile to try 
to understand God’s power as something like a creature’s powers. If God is radically different from 
creation, perhaps divine power is radically different from creaturely power; perhaps divine power is 
just not the same sort of thing as creaturely power. If so, the current project is beset by an unfounded 
sort of anthropomorphism (Gleeson 2010, cf. Pearce 2019). In response, I do think God’s power is 
radically different from ours, inasmuch as God can do things that we cannot, like create ex nihilo, and 
inasmuch as God’s power is infinite and ours is finite. But I do not think the core notion of power is 
radically different in God and in creatures. For, both God and creatures can make a causal difference 
 
5 Should you find yourself wondering, “But why in the world would I grant you classical theism?” you can simply take my 
argument as a conditional: if classical theism is true, then this is what divine power must be.  
6 For discussion and defense of dispositional necessitarianism, see Heil (2015), Marmodoro (2015), and Williams (2014); 
cf. Hannegan (2016). For arguments against necessitarianism, see McKitrick (2018: ch. 11), Mumford and Anjum (2011: 
ch. 3), and Schrenk (2010). Note that, even if one denies necessitarianism in cases of creaturely power, it would be very 
odd to deny it in the case of the divine: God is not the sort of being whose efforts may be stopped, or whose 
manifestation ‘success rate’ is less than 1.   
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in the world, and this just is to be causally efficacious, to have power. So, I follow Aquinas in 
predicating the same terms of God and creatures analogically. We can say literally true things about 
God, but must note that, in virtue of his transcendence, our predications do not carry entirely the 
same meaning (Clarke 2001: ch. 3, Davies 2012).   
 (ii) You might also object that, since God is radically different from creation, it just doesn’t 
matter if on-hand accounts of powers prove unsatisfactory in the case of divine power. Even if 
divine power is the same sort of thing as creaturely power, to think that it should fit neatly within 
on-hand accounts of powers is asking for too much. In almost all theistic metaphysical systems, God 
is the exception to the rule: for instance, theistic hylomorphists take substances to composites of 
form and matter, but claim that God is a substance that is pure form, and so, an exception to the rule. 
So why think it is a flaw of on-hand accounts of creaturely power if they cannot model God’s 
power?  
 In response, I do not think it is problematic if an adequate account of divine power fails to 
fit neatly with (or is an exception to) accounts of powers on-hand. Indeed, in at least some respects, 
an account of divine power will certainly diverge from accounts of creaturely power. But my aim is 
not to show that when accounting for God’s power, some accounts of creaturely powers prove 
inadequate, or that they cannot admit of amendment so as to be satisfactory. My goal is just to try to 
begin to make sense of divine power with on-hand accounts of creaturely power. It just happens that 
I think many accounts of creaturely power fail to model God’s power. This may or may not be a 
strike against such accounts in general, but I leave that discussion for another time.     
(iii) Many accounts of powers take them to be properties of a sort. On some accounts, 
powers are properties grounded in categorical or occurrent bases (Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson 
1982), on other accounts, there are purely dispositional properties lacking categorical bases 
(Shoemaker 1980), and yet still on other accounts, powers are one ‘side’ or ‘aspect’ of properties 
(Martin and Heil 1999). Whatever your preferred view, it seems that if you are to have powers, you 
must have properties. But on a classical conception of the divine, God is not propertied; God has no 
metaphysical composition at all. So how could such a God have power?  
In response, note that not all accounts take powers to be (grounded in or aspects of) 
properties; there are nominalist accounts of power according to which substances are powerful 
‘through’ themselves, not through their properties (Whittle 2009, 2016). While I’m not here 
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endorsing such a position in the case of creatures, given that I believe God is not characterized by 
properties (nor is a property), I must accept that at least one substance is powerful through itself, 
assuming, as I do, that God is a substance.   
2. Ontological Foundations of Powers 
A lump of sugar has the power to dissolve in a cup of hot coffee. That is, a lump of sugar is 
intrinsically such that when placed in a cup of hot coffee, it dissolves; it is somehow directed at or 
causally ready for the manifestation of being dissolved. The following accounts attempt to provide 
an ontological foundation for this directedness of powers.  
While most believe that we should and can provide truthmakers for our disposition talk, not 
everyone believes that we should countenance dispositions in our fundamental ontology. Although it 
might be odd for a humean to think that, deep down ontologically, God lacks power but ‘acts’ in a 
seemingly powerful way, it will be useful to examine accounts of power that are less than fully realist. 
I do not take up accounts of the semantics for dispositional ascriptions because, as should be clear 
by now, my interest is in their ontological foundations.7 After canvassing several quasi-humean 
accounts, I take up robust or realist accounts of powers.  
3.1. Quasi-Humean Accounts of Power 
(i) D.M. Armstrong (1986) rejects irreducibly dispositional properties; for him, the only natural 
properties are causally inert categorical or occurrent properties, putatively paradigm cases of which 
include shape and mass. He claims that the sugar will dissolve because the relevant categorical 
properties of sugar and hot coffee are related by a second-order necessitating relation (what he 
identifies as a law of nature). There is some two-place relation N ( , ) such that one categorical 
property G (dissolving) will follow of necessity upon the instantiation of another categorical 
property F (crystalline structure), should the right conditions obtain (being placed in hot coffee): N 
(F, G). If this is right, it is necessary that the sugar will dissolve in the hot coffee, but it is not 
because of the intrinsic, causal natures of sugar and coffee, but because of some external governing 
 




law.8 The upshot is that first- and second-order categorical properties and relations make disposition 
talk true. 
 This account of dispositions straightforwardly fails to model divine power.9 If ‘sugar has the 
power to dissolve in hot coffee’ is made true by external governing laws, fine; but God is not governed 
by anything. The exercise of divine power cannot, on pain of violating aseity and the basic idea that 
God is responsible for governing the world, be the result of a second-order property ‘forcing God’s 
hand.’ Moreover, second-order necessitating properties are creatures, and it is absurd to say that 
creatures govern God’s action. So Armstrong’s quasi-humean account of the foundation of 
dispositionality just doesn’t work for us here.  
 (ii) E.J. Lowe provides a more promising quasi-humean account of powers.10 For Lowe 
(2006: ch. 8), dispositionality is to be analyzed in terms of predication; he is suspicious that there 
could be two types of property, categorical and dispositional (cf. Mellor 2000: 767-769). When we 
claim that the sugar has the disposition or power to dissolve, Lowe thinks we’re claiming that the 
sugar is the kind of thing that can dissolve. Initially, this sounds uninformative, but for Lowe, kinds 
are substantial universals that objects instantiate. And, like Aristotle of the Categories (see Perin 2007), 
Lowe thinks these substantial universals are characterized by attributes, property universals like 
‘being dissolved.’ So sugar is disposed to dissolve in hot coffee because it belongs to a kind that is 
characterized by the attribute ‘being dissolved.’ The difference, for Lowe, between categorical 
predication and dispositional predication is that, in the case of the former, an object is characterized 
by a mode—by an occurrent, particular instance of some attribute—and, in the latter case, an object 
just belongs to a kind that is characterized by an attribute, a property universal not instantiated by 
the object. In short, Lowe thinks the sugar is soluble because it stands in a property relation 
 
8 The necessity of concern here is physical or natural, not metaphysical. The range of what, if anything, is metaphysically 
necessary for Armstrong is much narrower than, say, the range of what dispositional essentialists take to be 
metaphysically necessary. See Armstrong (1989).   
9 All of the quasi-humean accounts I consider rely essentially on properties, and so, violate the simplicity I assume of 
God. However, this by itself is a relatively uninteresting reason to reject such accounts. So, I do not mention this in my 
critiques, but simply register the point here.  
10 While Lowe seemed to take powers seriously, I do not think he was a thoroughgoing realist about them. For Lowe, 
properties are not intrinsically powerful or dispositional. Socrates doesn’t have the power to think because he is 
propertied in a certain way, but only because the substantial kind he instantiates is characterized by the attribute of 
thinking. So, for Lowe, it seems particulars have powers only inasmuch as they are related to kinds and attributes; 
powers are property-relation complexes. To my lights, this doesn’t sound like realist accounts of power according to 
which particulars are intrinsically modally and causally charged. For further discussion, see Dumsday (2016).  
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complex, one constituent of which is the uninstantiated (by this very lump of sugar) attribute of 
‘being dissolved.’  
 Like Armstrong’s view, Lowe’s account cannot make sense of divine power. For Lowe, the 
sugar having the power to dissolve means that being dissolved is a way the sugar can be, but isn’t 
currently. But applied to God, this conception of power flouts impassability, eternality, perfection, 
and the classical idea that God is infinite, not limited to any particular way of being. Impassability 
and eternality because God not being some way he could be implies that God can change, and 
therefore, is subject to time. And perfection because for God to be able to change implies that God 
is not fully actual, not in possession of all of his being at once. On a classical conception, God is, 
‘right now’ and all at once, all the ways God can be; God has all of his being from all of eternity.11  
But you might reply that God very well could be different ways without flouting these 
classical attributes; perhaps in creating one world rather than another, God ‘could have been 
different,’ and this relies in no way on anything but God himself. In response, note that, on this 
objection, God can’t himself be different ontologically in creating one world rather than another; for 
God’s being isn’t impacted in any way by what he creates. So, God doesn’t instantiate different 
properties because of what world he creates (setting aside simplicity for the moment). But, at this 
point, what work is Lowe’s account doing? If, per Lowe, power is understood in terms of properties 
some object can but doesn’t currently instantiate, it is unclear how the current proposal salvages his 
account.12  
(iii) Matthew Tugby (2013) has advanced the view that dispositions are platonic property-
relation complexes.13 His account is motivated by finding a satisfactory answer to Armstrong’s 
modal inversion objection to dispositionalism while doing justice to two dispositionalist platitudes: 
 
11 Moreover, it is unclear whether God can belong to a kind, as kind-membership is understood by Lowe. For Lowe, if S 
belongs to K, then S rigidly ontologically depends on K, and this seems to flatly flout aseity. For further discussion, see 
Lowe (2006: ch. 3) and Renz (forthcoming).  
12 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for prompting me to consider this objection.  
13 Tugby seems to take powers seriously too, and while I don’t wish to call his power ‘credentials’ into question, I can’t 
help but think his account is not wholly realist. Like Lowe, Tugby thinks powers are relational, and this seems to make 
them less ontologically genuine than full-blooded realists take them to be. For Armstrong, Lowe, and Tugby, properties 
are powerful if and only if they are properly linked up to other properties. But a property is generally thought to be 
powerful absolutely, that is, in the medieval sense of whether or not it is related in any particular way to some other 
entity. For discussion and critique of this aspect of Tugby’s account, see Oderberg (2017: 2399-2404); cf. Heil (2003: 79-
81, 122-124) and Martin (2008: 12-13).  
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(1) that dispositions are intrinsic features of objects, and (2) that dispositions exist whether or not 
they ever manifest.   
 Armstrong’s (1997: 79; cf. Handfield 2005: 452-456) modal inversion objection suggests that 
dispositions are ontologically suspicious because they point toward manifestations that do not exist. 
According to dispositionalists, the lump of sugar has the power to dissolve whether or not it ever 
dissolves, and that this is a matter of its intrinsic nature (platitudes 1 and 2). But suppose the lump 
of sugar never mingles with a cup of hot coffee, and no lump of sugar anywhere ever does, and so, 
that there is never an instance of dissolving. Armstrong thinks that the solubility of the sugar 
nonetheless ‘points toward’ the property of being dissolved. So, dispositions point toward non-
existent or Meinongian entities, and this is strange, to say the least.  
 Tugby’s reply is to claim that manifestation ‘targets’ like dissolving exist whether or not they 
are ever instantiated; they are platonic properties. So the lump of sugar points toward a dissolving 
manifestation because its properties are somehow related to the platonic property of being 
dissolved. He ends up with the view that for the sugar to be disposed to dissolve is for it to 
instantiate a platonic universal (‘crystalline structure’) that is properly related to another platonic 
universal, ‘being dissolved.’  
 Tugby’s account, while elegant, won’t work as a model for divine power. According to 
Tugby, objects are powerful only inasmuch as the properties they instantiate are properly related to 
other properties. The relation instantiated properties bear to other properties is the ground of 
power, not properties on their own. So, even if God did instantiate properties, he would not be 
powerful unless his properties were properly related to other properties. But this seems to violate 
aseity.14 For how could God be wholly independent if he could act only if something besides him 
existed? How can God exist a se if beings outside him condition his power, indeed, ground or constitute 
his being powerful?15 While there are general concerns about the compatibility of theism and 
platonism (see Craig 2016; cf. van Inwagen 2009), the tension between Tugby’s account and divine 
 
14 Plus, were God to instantiate some property, he would do so it seems by falling under, and so ontologically depending 
on, a platonic critter, and this seems to violate aseity too; but cf. Panchuk (2016). 
15 Thanks to Jon Kvanvig for helpful discussion on this point.  
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power is acute. For, not only would platonic fauna exist simply ‘side-by-side’ with God, they would 
ground his power, and this flouts the basic conception of aseity at work in classical theism.16    
3.2. Realist Accounts of Power 
What distinguishes quasi-humean accounts of power from realist accounts of power is that the 
former take powers to be reducible or non-basic while the latter deny this. That is, a realist denies 
that powers can be understood in terms of a proper linking of categorical properties, or anything of 
the like. For the realist, powers are ontological bedrock (Vetter 2015: 24, Williams 2019: §3.1).  
 Given this, you might wonder how much of an ‘account’ a realist can give. If by ‘account,’ 
one means a reductive analysis, then realists don’t give accounts of powers at all. But realists do 
explicate the notion of directedness, and so, try to put some meat on the bones of powers as 
properties ‘directed at’ manifestations. Here I survey two broad sorts of realist accounts, one 
teleological and one flatly primitive. In the end, I don’t think these two sorts of accounts are very 
different, but examining both will hopefully give us a better grasp on the notion of a power’s 
directedness.  
(i) David Oderberg (2017) seeks to make clear the notion of directedness without an appeal 
to intentionality, which some think would make dispositions, a sort of physical property, quasi-
mental (see Mumford 1999).17 He proposes the ancient and medieval notion of a telos or final cause 
as the best explanation of what directedness amounts to. For Oderberg (2017: 2395-2397; cf. Kroll 
2017: 22-28), a final cause is not a ‘striving’ or ‘desiring,’ but rather a delimiting or circumscribing of 
possible activity. A lump of sugar has dissolving as an end because part of its essence is to dissolve 
(in the right circumstances or when mingled with the right partners). Oderberg cashes out further 
this notion with the idea of selective indifference. Selective indifference “involves two components: (i) a 
specific range of possible manifestations of a power, and hence a specific range of possible kinds of 
behavior by the object having that power; (ii) indifference with respect to the circumstances of 
manifestation within that range” (2017: 2394). Sugar may dissolve, but may not fly (i), and sugar 
dissolves whether it is placed in hot coffee or water (ii).  
 
16 Coincidentally, Sarah Adams (2015) has argued that any classical account of omnipotence will flout aseity inasmuch as 
it makes God’s power extrinsic to him.  
17 Teleological accounts of dispositionality have also been defended by William Hannegan (2018) and Nick Kroll (2017). 
While the three accounts are different in important ways, I take up Oderberg’s account as representative of the 
teleological strategy in general.  
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With the notion of specific indifference in hand, Oderberg claims that ends or manifestation 
targets are built into the essence of disposition bearers, and that they may be considered, 
ontologically, as higher-order properties governing first-order properties. And so, Oderberg (2017: 
2397-2398) sums up his view: 
The reason for salt’s dissolution in water is the final cause of its behaviour: salt is governed 
by a higher-order property in virtue of which it behaves in water in a certain way. That 
higher-order property is part of the essence of salt, what scholastics—following Aristotle’s 
fourfold theory of causation—called the ‘formal cause’ of salt. In other words, it just is part 
of the essence of salt to be soluble in water: when we isolate any power or cluster of powers 
in virtue of which a substance behaves in certain ways, we are thereby isolating one or more 
final causes of the substance’s behaviour.       
So, sugar is directed at dissolving (among infinitely many other manifestations) because its essence is 
in part constituted by a higher-order property ‘nudging’ some of its first-order properties (crystalline 
structure) towards other first-order properties (being dissolved), should the right circumstances 
obtain, or should the right partners be properly mingled. And, contra Armstrong, Lowe, and Tugby, 
this directedness is wholly non-relational: “That salt needs water in order to dissolve in it does not 
entail that there must be any water for salt to be soluble, any more than my needing sounds in order 
to hear entails that there must be sounds for me to have the power of hearing” (2017: 2401). This is 
because selective indifference, and so, finality, is part of the essence of the disposition bearer, so 
“[u]nless the power bearer has a relational essence—in other words, is such that to be the kind of 
thing it is it must be in an actual relation to some other thing—then the power bearer’s directedness 
is a wholly intrinsic affair, a matter of how it is built to operate” (2017: 2400).  
 There is much to recommend this proposal. It partially elucidates the idea of directedness by 
appealing to the pedigreed notion of a natural end. It also makes directedness a wholly intrinsic 
affair of dispositions and their bearers, not some relation to realistically construed manifestation 
targets. This allows the account to respect aseity, as God’s power isn’t grounded in a reified 
manifestation target.  
 But you might have some worries when applying this sort of account to God. First, 
Oderberg’s account relies on first and higher order properties, and as such is not compatible with 
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the classical theism I am assuming. But I suspect that Oderberg’s account could be amended so as to 
do away with properties and deal with God’s simple essence only. Here is how.18  
First, I understand an essence as the what it is to be a thing, following Aristotle, Aquinas, and 
others (see Clarke 2001: ch. 5, Fine 1994, and Lowe 2018). Importantly, an essence is not a property. 
If the essence of a horse is the what it is to be a horse, and properties depend on substances or 
things, how could there be a subject, a horse, to possess the property of what it is to be a horse? 
This would require there to be a subject of some kind to possess a property that makes the subject 
the very thing it is, and this is clearly absurd.19   
 Now, if God is simple, his essence is his existence, and, of course, he lacks any metaphysical 
composition, such as property possession. So how could God possess higher order properties? One 
suggestion is just to treat God’s simple essence as both first and higher order property, and the 
‘possession’ relation as self-directedness. Metaphysically, there is just a simple God; there is no 
genuine possessing of himself by himself. But, in turning towards himself, there is a directionality 
similar to the directionality possessed, in Oderberg’s view, by creaturely powers. So God is directed 
at himself. In my view, there needn’t be a prejudice against essences in favor of properties; if a 
property can posses a (higher order) property, why can’t an essence? And why can’t an essence 
possess itself as a higher order ‘property’? While I don’t wish to imply Oderberg would endorse such 
a view, I think it is a plausible option before us.   
 Another concern is whether the notion of an end somehow implies that God seeks or strives 
for something, or is somehow incomplete. For, if God is infinite, perfect, and impassible, why would 
God desire, strive, or need anything besides himself?  
 I think we can adequately address this worry and that a response to it fits neatly with the 
above amendment of Oderberg’s view. It seems reasonable to think, with Aristotle (Meta. XII.7 
1072b 20-24) and some medieval Aristotelians, that God is his own end. The end or aim of God is 
his perfect and infinite essence, and so, God needn’t be directed at anything beyond himself. This 
sits well with the classical ideas that God somehow rejoices in his perfect, infinite being and creates 
through knowing and willing himself (Clarke 2001: 238).    
 
18 Many thanks to anonymous reviewers for prompting me to expand my discussion here.  
19 For a recent defense of an account of essence I’m sympathetic to, and especially the role essence plays in property 
possession, see Oderberg (2011).  
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 So, in virtue of something like a process of elimination up to this point, I suggest we accept 
tentatively the basic idea that directedness “is just a way of characterising part of the very essence of 
any object possessing a power…” (Oderberg 2017: 2393). So, a power is a part or the whole of the 
essence of a being that somehow encodes the ways in which it may (may not, and must) behave. The 
question now is whether flatly primitivist accounts of power give us any more than this, and, if they 
do, whether they are substantially different from teleological accounts and whether either account is 
wholly capable of modeling divine power. 
 (ii) Those who espouse what I call the flatly primitivist view include John Heil (2003, 2012), 
C.B. Martin (2008), C.B. Martin and Karl Pfeifer (1986), U.T. Place (1996), and George Molnar 
(2003). While these views are often characterized as ‘intentionalist’ because they argue physical 
properties have a directedness similar to mental states, I believe their views are better described as 
‘primitivist’ because they refuse to model ontologically a power’s directedness in any way. They have 
it that a power’s directedness is a wholly intrinsic affair and non-relational. A power is a directed 
property, where there is no directedness relation and no ontologically reified ‘target’ at which the 
property is directed. So while these authors make use of the notion of intentionality, they 
nonetheless take the directionality of powers to be ontologically basic. Heil and Martin sum up 
nicely the contours of the primitivist view:   
Imagine a key with a particular shape. The key would open locks of a particular 
(complementary) shape. This power is intrinsic to the key. If the key ‘points beyond’ itself to 
locks of a particular sort, it does so in virtue of its intrinsic features. This is what it is to be a 
key of this shape. The key is (as Martin would put it) ‘ready to go’. We can say this without 
committing ourselves to the existence of possible locks. The truth‐maker for ‘this key would 
open a lock of kind K’ is not the key, a possible lock of kind K, and a relation between the 
key and K. The truth‐maker for the assertion is just the key itself's being a particular way: its 
being rigid and its possessing a particular shape. (Heil 2003: 124) 
Causal dispositions are directive and selective—that is, they are dispositions for and to some 
kinds of manifestation rather than others—and so they are, whether physical or mental, in 
their very nature directive, projective, discriminatory readinesses for and to what is external to 
themselves... Dispositions or readiness potentials exist embodying programs for, not for, and 
even prohibitive against an infinity of manifestations…  (Martin 2008: 59-60) 
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Powers are properties of a subject that direct it toward some type of manifestation, and this 
directedness implies neither that the manifestation exist somehow, nor that the power is in any 
ontologically serious way related to the manifestation. The sugar is, as Martin suggests, programmed to 
dissolve in hot coffee, and this is an ontologically basic feature of the sugar’s intrinsic nature (see 
also Ross 2008: ch. 7, Williams 2019: §4.3).   
 As I see it, the primitivist view as explicated by Heil, Martin, and others is strikingly similar 
to the teleological view propounded by Oderberg. Both camps deny that a power’s directedness is a 
relation to some reified manifestation, and both camps flesh out directedness in terms of a range of 
possible behavior grounded in a power’s nature or essence. While not as explicitly essentialist as 
Oderberg, Heil seems to make this latter point in the above quote: “This [having the power to 
unlock a type of lock] is what it is to be a key of this shape” (my emphasis).  
4. An Ontological Account of Divine Power 
Allow me to suggest, for our purposes here, that teleological and primitivist accounts of power differ 
only in that the former have a label for the metaphysically basic directedness both views 
countenance.20 Henceforth, I treat them as one. The question now is whether or not, given that the 
quasi-humean accounts so far considered cannot work as models for God’s power, a realist account 
can adequately model divine power. I think a realist account can, and I think developing such an 
account is a matter of tweaking the teleological and primitivist accounts we’ve just encountered. 
 First and foremost, any account will need to do away with properties. As I suggested above, 
I think Oderberg’s account can do away with properties. Rather than talk of first and higher order 
properties constitutive of a thing’s essence, we should, when thinking about God, just talk of God’s 
simple essence. God’s power to create and sustain reality, answer prayers, et cetera are not properties 
constitutive of God’ essence, but are simply different ways he can express his essence. And as I 
mentioned in §2 above, there are accounts of power according to which substances are powerful 
through themselves and not through their properties, and so, if God has no properties, we have the 
makings for a framework for understanding a simple God’s power. 
 
20 I do not, however, want to suggest that defenders of the primitivist view would be happy with the teleological 
machinery in Oderberg’s account (or that Oderberg would be happy with the commitments of the primitivist account). 
My suggestion to treat them as one is just for my purposes here.  
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 At this point you might object that since a power is at least partly individuated by the 
manifestations it is directed at, and since God can create, answer prayers, et cetera that it seems God 
has more than one power. But this violates my presumption of divine simplicity, even if powers 
aren’t properties.  
 There are two responses to this sort of objection. The first is to question whether God is 
genuinely manifesting different powers when he creates, answers prayers, et cetera. Perhaps creating 
and answering prayers, however distinct they may seem to us, are one and the same type of 
manifestation of God’s power? For instance, is the act of answering a child’s prayer asking that their 
parents bring home a puppy really different from the act of creating a world in which that child’s 
parents do in fact bring home a puppy? I’m not sure I see the difference here, but pursuing this line 
of response any further takes us too far afield. Second, it is plausible that one and the same power 
can manifest itself in different ways. To borrow an example from Heil, a round ball can roll on an 
incline, appear round visually, and leave a circular impression on a pillow, and it can do all of these 
things in virtue of a single property, its roundness. Metaphysicians claim this means that some 
powers are multi-track: one and the same power can bring about many, if not infinitely many, 
different manifestations (see Vetter 2013, Williams 2011).21 If this is right, then there is no need to 
claim that God has as many powers as types of manifestations he can bring about. Following Heil 
(2012: 120-122), we might claim that God’s power manifests in different ways with different 
manifestation partners (or with different triggers): God’s power in concert with a petitionary prayer 
yields the manifestation of God’s answering that prayer, and God’s power in concert with, say, a 
virtuous agent yields a beneficial final judgment.22     
 So, suppose that God’s power to create and sustain reality, say, is an end or manifestation at 
which God’s essence is directed, full-stop. What more needs to be done? Beyond doing away with 
properties, we need to say something about the stimulus conditions in or manifestation partners 
 
21 While I find the idea that some, if not all, powers are multi-track quite plausible, I should note that such a position is 
not entirely uncontroversial. Some prominent powers theorists reject the existence of multi-track powers, e.g. Lowe 
(2010) and Molnar (2003).  
22 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to expand my discussion here, and for raising a number of 
fascinating questions regarding the multi-track nature of God’s power, particularly whether or not such a nature implies 
God’s power is complex, not simple. A brief response: I do not think so. The multiplicity of multi-track powers comes 
from the multiplicity of their manifestation partners or stimuli, not their intrinsic nature. Sugar tastes sweet to those with 
properly functioning palates, and not to those with malfunctioning palates, but the sugar is one and the same. I discuss 
this question more, and amend my account slightly, below.   
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with which God’s power manifests. For, God did create, but didn’t need to; God’s power could 
have stayed dormant, unmanifested. So what ‘triggered’ God’s power to create?    
 Right away, we should be clear that without supposing creation to already exist, there cannot 
be anything separate from God that triggered his power to create. So, whatever ‘triggered’ God’s 
power to create has to be something within God in a sense, and so, be God himself. Second, we 
cannot think, whatever the trigger be, that it somehow nudged or forced God to create. This is 
because God chose to create freely, and because, I am assuming, God is impassible.  
 So what could it be that sprung God’s power into action? I think there are two plausible 
answers that work within the current teleological-primitivist account and respect classical theism. 
First, following Augustine, Aquinas, and others, we might claim that God’s power is somehow 
triggered by or mutually manifests with divine ideas. Traditionally, divine ideas were taken to be 
exemplars or models according to which God created (see Doolan 2008). You could also conceive 
of them as possible worlds, or just the various possible outcomes of God’s power, that is, what is 
within the range of God’s omnipotence.   
 But two worries now present themselves. First, you might think a dualism between God and 
his ideas violates simplicity. However, there are recent and promising attempts to show that divine 
ideas do not violate divine simplicity (for example, Panchuk forthcoming), and I am content 
deferring to these and future research for now. However, the more serious worry is to understand 
how the presence of a divine idea triggers God’s power. Since God did not have to create, and since 
divine ideas would exist whether or not God created, it is unclear what triggering work such ideas 
could do. For, triggers (or mutual manifestation partners) are such that, should they come on the 
scene, a power will of necessity manifest. Moreover, if divine ideas are possible worlds or exemplars 
of all of what’s metaphysically possible, and they all exist in the mind of God, how does the current 
proposal explain why God exercised his power to create this world rather than some other? So, 
something is missing from the current proposal.  
 The second proposal for what might trigger God’s power can be modeled on a case 
considered by Heil (2012: 124-126). A radium atom spontaneously decays and emits, among other 
things, α and β particles. There is no telling when the radium will decay. Nor is there any trigger or 
manifestation partner that when mingled with the radium results in its decaying; the manifestation of 
its power to decay is akin to, Heil says, an Aristotelian unmoved mover’s power to put others in 
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motion. So, it seems we have a concrete example of power manifestations that lack triggers or 
manifestation partners. We might claim that God’s power is just like this: it lacks any triggers or 
manifestation partners. It just manifests, full-stop.  
 One worry you might have with this proposal, if taking the analogy with radium seriously, is 
that it seems to make the manifestation of God’s power inexplicable. If the science is right, it is 
indeterminate when exactly the radium will decay. But we don’t want to claim that the manifestation 
of God’s power is inexplicable; that would seem to make creation random, unintelligible. 
  I have two responses: first, there is a temporal disanalogy between the radium and God. 
With Augustine and many others, I think it is just wrongheaded to ask ‘when’ God creates, for God 
created time itself. So, there is no indeterminacy or randomness as to ‘when’ God creates. Second, 
even in the case of the radium, it isn’t that there is no sufficient reason for when the radium decays. 
While the exact time at which the radium decays appears genuinely undetermined, there is a sufficient 
reason for the overall rate at which it decays. This is just the half-life of the radium, and so, a feature 
of its essence or nature. If this is right, although the exact time at which some radium emits an α or 
β particle is indeterminate, there is, grounded in the radium’s nature, a sufficient reason for its 
emission of α or β particles generally. And we can say just the same about God: the manifestation of 
God’s power is not indeterminate or random in any sense, but grounded in his nature.  
 But these responses don’t settle things entirely. For, we might think, even if God’s power 
requires no trigger or manifestation partner, there still must be a sufficient reason for its 
manifestation at all, or in general. We can say that God’s essence explains or provides a sufficient 
reason for how he created, but we still don’t know why he created, given that he didn’t need to. The 
radium must decay, but God needn’t create.  
 Here I think we must remember that God is an agent, that God has a will. We shouldn’t 
think of God’s power as just like the sugar’s power to dissolve. The sugar and its power are non-
agential, whereas God is an agent: the sugar cannot give any input on whether or not it will manifest 
its power to dissolve, but God can (though not for a power to dissolve!). Indeed, on the classical 
conception of God I’m working with, God’s will is his power (and God is his will, and is his power). 
This doesn’t mean that I think God’s will, his act of choosing to create, is the trigger for or 
manifestation partner with which his power is activated. What it means, for our purposes here at 
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least, is that God’s willing is the exercise of his power. So, God’s power manifests not because of 
some stimulus from without, as is the case with most creaturely powers, but because he wills it to.23  
 Now, we must still answer why God’s power results in one manifestation rather than 
another, for example, why God created this world rather than some other world. If God’s power is 
multi-track, how are we to understand the conditions under which it brings about numerous 
different effects? Since God himself is the only candidate for a ‘trigger’ of divine power, and his 
willing is what explains the exercise of that power at all, there can be no difference in manifestation 
because of difference in trigger or manifestation partner (as I initially suggested above). So, 
metaphysically, what explains how the same power and same ‘trigger’ can bring about different 
results?   
Here, again, we must note that God is an agent. God’s power may bring about various 
manifestations because he may will it to. So, God created this world rather than that world because 
he willed this world rather than that world. While this may seem like a shallow explanation, it 
shouldn’t if we take it that God’s will alone is enough to ‘trigger’ his power in general. The nature of 
a will is to choose, and if God can choose to manifest his power in the first place, it seems natural 
that he can choose how to manifest it. Perhaps you could ask how God ‘sees’ or ‘imagines’ what he 
creates, or from what options he chooses, and here I think the divine ideas may play an important 
role: God cognizes one world in particular and wills to manifest his power to create it, rather than 
some other world.  
But even if this is a satisfactory response to how God can manifest his power is different 
ways, it is still reasonable to wonder why God manifests his power in the particular ways he does. 
Here, I think we can take recourse in God’s perfect goodness, wisdom, and justness. Even though 
God has the power to annihilate all of reality (one way to exercise his power), he continues to 
sustain it (another way to exercise his power) because he is infinitely good, wise, and just. While the 
infinite power of God might sound like a power to do anything (logically possible) whatsoever, we 
must remember that God’s perfect goodness and the rest will ‘guide’ the manifestation of that power 
in only some directions.  
 
23 As Aquinas writes: “For God does things because He wills to do so; yet the power to do them does not come from 
His will, but from His nature” (ST, I, q25. a5. ad1.) 
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 If this is on track, I think we’re in a position to sum up the preceding discussion and 
formulate, in rough outline, the beginnings of an ontological account of divine power. Divine power is 
a wholly intrinsic, non-relational, primitive directedness of God’s essence whose manifestation depends on (but really 
just is) God’s free choice to create. We can understand this directedness as a divine self-directed telos, or a 
flatly primitive feature of the divine-essence—again, for our purposes here, I think this difference is 
substantially terminological.        
 You might worry that this account just is the classical conception of divine creation (and so 
power) as God knowing/willing/loving himself, and so, makes for no genuine progress in 
understanding God’s power. But I take it that my account’s fitting neatly with the classical account 
of creation is a good-making feature, not a defect. My goal has been to provide an ontological 
account or foundation of divine power, just as many metaphysicians have tried to provide 
ontological accounts or foundations of the directedness of creaturely power. My goal has not been 
to break new ground on a metaphysical account of creation. Given this, if an adequate ontological 
account of divine power diverged from the classical conception of creation (assuming one is already 
onboard with this conception), it would be problematic, not a virtue of the account. 
5. Conclusion and Upshot 
Much has been written about how God creates and sustains the world, how God might intervene in 
the world, how God might govern the world, and what God’s being all-powerful amounts to. But 
little has been written directly about what, deep down ontologically, God’s power is. I have 
attempted to do so here, and my conclusion is that God’s power is understood best as an intrinsic, 
non-relational, primitive directedness grounded in the divine essence, whose manifestation depends 
on God’s free choice. Again, I don’t take myself to have broken new ground here, but do take 
myself to have called attention to an intriguing lacuna in the literature, and to have begun filling it. 
More work needs to be done to make the above account precise, and more still on the relations such 
an account bears to the above questions regarding intervention, omnipotence, and the like.  
 An interesting upshot worth noting is that the only account of a power’s directedness that is 
suitable for the case of God is one where that directedness is taken to be primitive. That is, quasi-
humean accounts of power, accounts that reduce intrinsic directedness to property-relation 
complexes and the like, just can’t model divine power (at least without flouting some classical and 
neo-classical divine attributes). This means that, should a theist be a humean about the creaturely 
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realm, they must be a full-blooded Aristotelian about the divine realm. While this might not seem 
like much of a bullet to bite to those already in the realist, Aristotelian camp, I find it suggestive for 
the overall prospects of a broadly-humean metaphsyic.24  
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